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American political science is a congenitally unsettled discipline, witnessing a number of movementsdesigned to reorient its fundamental character. Four prominent movements are compared here:the statism accompanying the discipline’s early professionalization, the pluralism of the late 1910s
and early 1920s, behavioralism, and the Caucus for a New Political Science (with a brief glance at the
more recent Perestroika). Of these movements, only the first and third clearly succeeded. The discipline
has proven very hard to shift. Despite the rhetoric that accompanied behavioralism, both it and statism
were revolutions without enemies within the discipline (other than those appearing after they succeeded),
and therein lies the key to their success.
Many have tried to change the character ofAmerican political science, but few have suc-ceeded. The revolutionaries in question are
those who have sought in a group enterprise to set
the agenda for the discipline in conscious rejection of
most or all of what has gone before. In these terms,
the discipline has seen five revolutionary movements.
(Proclamation and establishment of a new research
program, such as structural functionalism or biopoli-
tics, does not qualify, and “paradigm shift” in Kuhn’s
[1962] sense is generally not an appropriate frame.)
First came those who founded the discipline in the late
nineteenth century as a professionalized state-building
science in a seemingly recalcitrant polity—–and against
amateur political analysis. Next came the pluralists,
who in the early twentieth century took up arms against
the monistic state and its disciplinary handmaiden.
Third came thebehavioralists of themid-twentieth cen-
tury, who revolted on behalf of the study of actual be-
havior, science, the political system (as opposed to the
state), and (again) pluralism. Fourth came the Caucus
for a New Political Science in the late 1960s and early
1970s, which rejected behavioralism’s alleged complic-
ity in the status quo of American politics in favor of a
politically committed political science oriented to the
social crisis of the times. Fifth came the Perestroika
movement of the early twenty-first century, targeted
against perceived hegemony of formal and quantita-
tive approaches, in favor of methodological pluralism,
qualitative inquiry, and again an orientation to pressing
public problems.
Because Minerva’s owl has yet to take flight over
Perestroika, I will say little about it, but of the previ-
ous four movements, only two succeeded. A successful
revolution may be defined in terms of resetting the
discipline’s agenda, as validated by the recognition of
practitioners, whether or not they shared the move-
ment’s commitments. Practitioners then have to posi-
tion themselves in relation to the new understanding,
even if they do not share it. Success must be recognized
as such; this may seem like an obvious criterion, yet it
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rules out at least one alleged revolution, as we will see.
What is most striking about the two movements that
did succeed, the statism of the disciplinary founding
and behavioralism, is that they did not have any seri-
ous enemies inside the discipline who could articulate
opposition to the rise of the new persuasion. These
enemies only appeared after the movement’s success,
and so paradoxically validated the transformation in
question. Although one should be cautious about gen-
eralizing on the basis of four cases, these are the only
cases we have. The lesson would seem to be that the
discipline can be transformed in revolutionary fashion
only by movements with no existing enemies prepared
to resist. To put it another way, in a century and a half of
American political science, no reform movement has
ever succeeded if it opposed the actual practice of the
discipline in away thatmetwith explicit resistance from
practitioners. American political science may be just as
hard to reform in fundamental ways as the American
political system that has so often frustrated reformists
from within our discipline’s ranks, from Francis Lieber
to Theodore Lowi.
I focus here on developments in the study of United
States politics, sometimes integratedwith, thoughmore
recently separated from, political theory. Much could
be said about comparative politics and international
relations, but it is orientation to the study of Ameri-
can politics that defines theAmerican discipline’s basic
identity and normative purpose.
IN THE BEGINNING WAS THE STATE
The concept of “the state” was cemented into Ameri-
can political discourse by figures who were to become
central to the new discipline of political science in the
late nineteenth century (though the concept had found
mention as far back as the arguments of the Federal-
ists in the constitutional debates; Farr 1993, 69). From
Francis Lieber, appointed to the first American profes-
sorship in history and political science at Columbia in
1857, to Woodrow Wilson and well beyond, the main
practical task of political science was seen as the es-
tablishment of a unitary national state accompanied
by a virtuous national citizenry. Wilson was far from
alone in envisaging a political system with disciplined
parties presenting well-reasoned policies to informed
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voters, enacted by Congress, and implemented by
an expert bureaucracy practicing the best in ad-
ministrative science. This administrative state would
“breathe free American air” (Wilson 1887). Such
normative advocacy was linked to a host of empir-
ical studies of American institutions exposing frag-
mentation, sectionalism, parochialism, and corruption.
Wilson’s (1885) own Congressional Government exem-
plified this genre.
For over half a century, the central purpose of polit-
ical science was seen as the establishment of a unified
state, supported by a unified and competent nation. In
the first presidential address to the new American Po-
litical Science Association (APSA), Frank Goodnow
(1904) spoke of the role of political science in assisting
the “realization of State will.” Occasionally political
allies could be found for this project—–especially in
the Progressive Movement. More often the project
foundered in the face of the corruption, patronage,
party machines, parochialism, and regionalism that the
statists sought to supplant, and the recalcitrance of
the Madisonian system that the discipline’s leaders be-
lieved was inadequate for a dynamic modern industrial
economy and society. Some, though not all, opposed
federalism in the name of a unified national state.
The discipline was, then, founded not only to study
politics but also to advance a political agenda—–and all
subsequent revolutionary movements share this fea-
ture (though in the case of behavioralism it was not
initially admitted). The founders were of course en-
gaged in establishing the discipline rather than chang-
ing it, but they consciously rejected a particular kind of
amateur political analysis; they were in this sense in-
tellectual revolutionaries. The amateur approach to the
study of politics wasmanifested in theAmerican Social
Science Association (ASSA), founded in 1865 and fi-
nally put to bed by the establishment of APSA in 1903
and the American Sociological Association in 1905.
ASSA was largely reformist, Christian, activist, and
oriented to public welfare (Seidelman and Harpham
1984, 20), and not conducive to the serious study of pol-
itics that asked hard questions about the fundamental
character of American political reality. The founders
of the professional discipline of political science did,
then, establish a radically new intellectual agenda, and
the concept of “the state” was professionally central
in establishing the new discipline’s identity (Gunnell
1995, 21). There was no resistance to this project from
inside the nascent discipline because those supplanted
remained firmly on the outside.
THE PLURALIST REVOLT
TheUnited States had always been amore plural polity
than the discipline’s statists desired; they recognized
pluralism as a fact, but were likely to call it frag-
mentation, a problem to be overcome rather than a
condition to be valued. This was true even of Arthur
Bentley, whose 1908 book The Process of Government
was treated as a precursor by behavioralism’s pluralists.
In his later unpublished work Makers, Users and Mas-
ters, Bentley actually condemned the domination of
American politics by groups (Seidelman andHarpham
1984, 77–78). The same was true of that other ancestor
of behavioralism, Charles Merriam, who in the 1920s
still sought “national democratic consolidation and so-
cial control” (Gunnell 1993, 105). Though stripped of
its more organic associations, the centralizing state re-
mained alive as normative aspiration in the 1920s.
Normative pluralism arrived with Harold Laski
(1917), Mary Parket Follett (1918), and their sym-
pathizers. Laski and Follett were influenced by the
philosophy of William James, who stressed the vari-
ety of ways in which individuals could experience the
world; so their pluralist ethics was rooted in diver-
sity of experience rather than in diversity of interest.
Follett valued the organization of society from the bot-
tom up in groups, not the social engineering from the
top down that the discipline’s statists always favored.
Follett (10) famously asked, “What is to be done with
this diversity?” The statist answer was clear: erase it.
Beyond valuing it, her own answer was less clear in its
implications for political reform.
According to Gunnell (2004), the rise of plural-
ism in the 1920s constituted the only true revolution
in the history of American political science. Gun-
nell’s key figure is George Catlin (1927), not Laski or
Follett. Catlin was influenced by Laski, but rejected
Laski’s ethics in favor of disinterested science. Un-
like Laski and Follett, Catlin’s pluralism was based
on the self-interest of groups, not on their diversity
of experience—–and in this he was followed by the plu-
ralists of the behavioral era, who to Gunnell were not
revolutionaries at all, but mere successors to Catlin’s
paradigm shift.
Yet if we look at the substance of Catlin’s work, we
see an explanation of politics that the statists could
accept without too much difficulty—–remembering that
they had often recognized plurality, but saw it as
a problem to be overcome. Thus Catlin’s pluralism
as empirical reality was hardly revolutionary. Even
William Yandell Elliott, identified by Gunnell as the
leader of the statist opposition to pluralism in the
1920s, could accept pluralism as explanatory theory,
as Gunnell himself admits (Gunnell 1995, 36). It was
only normative pluralism that Elliott opposed. Thus it
is only in its normative aspects that pluralism could
be truly revolutionary—–and in this sense Laski and
Follett were better placed to lead a revolution than
Catlin. But clearly their work did not reorient the
discipline—–which adopted normative pluralism explic-
itly only in the 1950s, and then in very different terms,
stressing interest rather than experience as the root
of plurality (see Schlosberg 1998 on differences across
generations of pluralism).
The main reason we cannot categorize the dispute
of the 1920s as a revolution is that it was not vali-
dated as such by disciplinary practitioners in the after-
math, and so was not in a position to orient the work
of the discipline thereafter. Can a revolution happen
without anyone noticing? Gunnell’s (2005) solution to
this problem is to quote Kuhn (1962) on the “invisibil-
ity” of revolutions as the new understanding comes to
dominate. But here Kuhn is referring to the tendency
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of adherents of a victorious paradigm to rewrite the
past so as to recast their predecessors as precursors
in a cumulative history; and nothing like this actually
happened in political science between the 1920s and
1940s. Moreover, on Kuhn’s account those responsible
for the breakthrough would be recognized and praised
for their achievements, elevated to thedisciplinary pan-
theon. Catlin was not recognized in these terms. The
only attempted revolution of the 1920s was that of the
normative pluralists; and that did not succeed. Resis-
tance within the discipline was stiff, including Charles
Beard, Walter Shepard, Francis Coker, and William
Yandell Elliott, among others. Laski was stigmatized
as a radical socialist, and pluralism itself was character-
ized by Elliott (1928) as related to Italian fascism. Nor-
mative statist aspirations remained, though they were
subsequently to diminish (before revival in Theodore
Lowi’s [1969] The End of Liberalism, linked to the
earlier statists in what Seidelman and Harpham [1984]
call the “third tradition” of centralizing and reformist
political science). Language changed, and by midcen-
tury “the state” had almost disappeared from the dis-
ciplinary lexicon, except in international relations.
BEHAVIORALISM
Behavioralism may be defined in terms of its com-
mitments to “(1) a research focus on political behav-
ior, (2) a methodological plea for science, and (3) a
political message about liberal pluralism” (Farr 1995,
202), as well as the organizing concept of a polit-
ical system (Easton 1953). Although behavioralism
emphasized the individual, there was no problem in
studying “. . . individuals acting in groups to realize
their collective interests” (Farr, 204). The two most
prominent group theorists of the early behavioral era,
Robert Dahl and David Truman, were also commit-
ted behavioralists (Truman chaired the Social Science
Research Council’s Committee on Political Behavior
in the 1950s). The pluralism in the political message
was based on economic interest rather than on ex-
perience, and on an underlying consensus on funda-
mentals across different interests that in the United
States could be assumed, rather than struggled for
(see, notably, Dahl 1956). By the early 1960s many
works were appearing that celebrated behavioralism’s
triumph (notably Dahl 1961). This certainly felt like
a revolution, recognized as having reoriented the dis-
ciplinary agenda—–by those who eventually criticized
behavioralism, as well as those who supported it.
But what exactly did behavioralism oppose? The
rhetoric of the revolutionaries was directed against for-
mal, historical, and, in Easton’s (1953) words, “hyper-
factual” work, defining something called “traditional”
political science. But who exactly was practicing tradi-
tional political science, and what was it? The behav-
ioralists were strangely silent on the identity of their
opponents and the actual content of specific pieces of
work. Garceau’s (1951) Review manifesto contained
no references at all, positive or negative. The most sus-
tained attack on the alleged status quo was Easton’s
(1953) self-consciously revolutionary The Political
System, characterized by Farr (1995, 207) as “the sin-
gle most important manifesto lodged against tradi-
tional political science during the behavioral revolu-
tion.” Easton is lauded by Gunnell (1993, xi) as “the
movement’s most significant theoretician.” Chapter 2
of The Political System, “The Condition of American
Political Science” (with a section on “The Malaise of
Political Science”) is the most polemical. The chapter
contains 28 footnotes, none of which names a contem-
poraneous American political scientist guilty of the
alleged sins of hyperfactualism and failure to theorize.
Names that do figure in these footnotes areKey, Simon,
Merriam, Herring, Appleby, Lasswell, Gosnell, and
Eldersveld, praised for being exceptions. In the section
of Chapter 3 on “Hyperfactualism,” the only sustained
critique is of the writings of James Bryce, works by
then half a century old. In Chapter 10, Easton criti-
cizes political theorists for retreating into the history
of political thought; but of his main references, only
George Sabine remained active.
Much later, Easton (1993, 292–93, originally pub-
lished 1985) describes “traditional political science” of
the 1920s to 1940s as focusing on parties and pres-
sure groups (NB: not on the state). His references
on pressure groups are Bentley (1908) and Pendleton
Herring (1929). By 1953 Bentley had passed from the
scene—–and was also revived as a protobehavioralist,
especially by Truman (1951). Herring was alive and
well, and had in 1949 been instrumental in establish-
ing the Committee on Political Behavior of the Social
Science Research Council (of which he was president),
one of the institutional sponsors of the behavioral revo-
lution. Easton (1993) reiterates the behavioralists’ con-
tention that the traditionalists mixed facts and values,
had too much description and too little explanation,
and offered few overarching theories. But Easton then
identifies Merle Fainsod’s “parallelogram of forces”
as the main “latent theory” of the traditionalists. In
this parallelogram, policy decision was explained as
the resultant of the various forces pulling in different
directions. If this is the essence of “traditional polit-
ical science” of that era, there should have been no
reason for its practitioners to object to anything in be-
havioralism; and they did not. Fainsod himself became
president of the APSA in the behavioral era, and as
president in 1968 was instrumental in defending the
discipline’s establishment against theCaucus for aNew
Political Science by restricting access to the Annual
Conference’s program.
Nor could any hostility to behavioralism be found in
any alleged practitioners of formal institutional analy-
sis as opposed to science. Criticism of excess formalism
and advocacy of science had been in place since the
discipline’s founding. Formalism had been attacked
by Bentley and Wilson, among others (Seidelman and
Harpham 1984, 75). And nobody was against science.
Throughout the discipline’s history, criticism of the
preceding generation for its want of science is a con-
stant refrain. The constitution of the APSA adopted
at its founding in 1903 proclaimed its main objec-
tive as “the encouragement of the scientific study of
politics.”
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If the behavioral revolution’s main tenets are
behavior, science, pluralism, and system, then
“traditionalists” had little reason to oppose it. Re-
search on behavior at the individual level was already
being done in the 1930s and 1940s (byHerring,Gosnell,
Lasswell, Lazarsfeld, and others)—–and those who did
not do it had little objection to those who did. The
commitment to science was of long standing, though
as Easton (1991, 209–10) points out, an emphasis on
basic science as opposed to social problems served the
discipline particularly well during the McCarthy era of
political witch-hunts. (This considerationmay also help
explain the lack of traction of Lasswell’s policy science
approach, developed in that era.) Pluralism as empiri-
cal theory was hardly new—–indeed, the “latent theory”
of the traditionalists as characterized by Easton sounds
a lot like pluralism. Easton’s own “political system”
concept wasmore novel—–though its main function was
to provide a new vocabulary (inputs, outputs, and feed-
back) rather than a comprehensive theory of politics.
What, then was the behavioral revolution? The an-
swer is that it was a selective radicalization of exist-
ing disciplinary tendencies, especially when it came
to behavior, science, and pluralism as description and
explanatory theory. Behavioralism led to more survey
research being funded and published, an increase in
the relative frequency of quantitative studies in the
discipline’s top journals, and a relative decline in work
addressed to public policy. The emphasis on science
facilitated access to new funding sources such as the
National Science Foundation. Behavior overshadowed
institutions, though institutions were never forgotten.
Most of these changes involved shifts in emphasis
rather than radical novelty.
Thekindofwork that behavioralismwasmost clearly
a shift from was a relatively new sort of political theory,
which had the effect of crystallizing political theory
as a separate and marginalized subfield. Prior to the
behavioral revolution, theorists (pluralists and statists
alike) were central to the discipline and debates about
its identity. But by the early 1950s, emigre´ scholars such
as Hannah Arendt, Leo Strauss, and Eric Voegelin
were lending a decidedly antiliberal cast to political
theory. The solution, on Gunnell’s (1988) account, was
a divorce between political theory and the new main-
stream that suited both sides. Behavioralists could dis-
tance themselves from any political critique of Amer-
ican liberal democracy. The only kind of broad-gauge
political theory that could stay within the mainstream
was the liberal democratic work of scholars such as
Dahl (1956).
Beyond shifts in disciplinary emphasis, the only truly
novel aspect of the behavioral revolution came in
interest-based pluralism as normative theory (despite
the ostensible commitment to value-neutral inquiry).
By the 1950s the old normative theory of the state had
few disciplinary advocates. Even Elliott, who in the
late 1920s had on Gunnell’s (2005) account organized
resistance to pluralism and in the 1950s remained an
important presence in the discipline, did not come to
the state’s defense. The state, it seems, had withered
away (at least in the discipline). In a political context
defined by the recent defeat of two absolutist states in a
World War, and a Cold War against a third, it was hard
to argue for anything that looked like an overhaul of
American politics along statist lines.
None of this meant that behavioralism had a com-
pletely easy ride. Easton (1991, 208) complains that in
the late 1950s behavioralists still felt excluded from the
Review and the Association—–though that may have
been a matter of institutional inertia rather than pol-
icy. The complaints should not have been too loud, for
in 1951 the Review had published Oliver Garceau’s
(1951) behavioral manifesto, and by 1955 Angus
Campbell, James C. Davies, Samuel Eldersfeld, Heinz
Eulau, V. O. Key, Avery Leiserson, Warren Miller,
William Riker, and Herbert Simon had all published
in the Review.
Behavioralism did have its critics, but these did
not arrive until the 1960s; indeed, their arrival con-
firmed behavioralism’s success in setting the disci-
pline’s agenda, as recognized even by those who op-
posed it. Contra Farr (1995, 216), the opponents were
not “those stigmatized as ‘traditionalists”’ (Farr pro-
vides no names). One set was composed of Straussian
theorists (Storing 1962). The Straussians did not rep-
resent any prebehavioral disciplinary orthodoxy; their
school developed alongside the rise of behavioralism,
and was doubly isolated as a minority sect within the
newly marginalized subfield of political theory. The
other set was composed of those on the discipline’s left
(Charlesworth 1962, Bay 1965) whose heat was turned
up in the late 1960s. The left critics did not defend any
“traditionalism” (though historians of political thought
were among their number). Rather, they sought amore
critical and committed political science as an alter-
native to behavioralism’s alleged ideological complic-
ity in an unjust status quo in politics in the United
States.
CHILDREN OF THE REVOLUTION: THE
CAUCUS FOR A NEW POLITICAL SCIENCE
The left’s criticisms of behavioralism coalesced in, and
helped define, the next movement that tried to reori-
ent American political science, the Caucus for a New
Political Science. The Caucus was organized at the
1967 Annual Meeting of the American Political Sci-
ence Association. Prominent members included Peter
Bachrach, Christian Bay, Theodore Lowi, Michael
Parenti, Alan Wolfe, and Sheldon Wolin. Room was
also found for the international relations realist Hans
Morgenthau (who opposed the Vietnam War), the
Caucus candidate for APSA president in 1971. Among
their number were political theorists keen to bring the
critique of U.S. liberal democracy into the disciplinary
center from the margins of the subfield to which it had
been exiled in the early 1950s. In step with the dissi-
dent politics of the late 1960s, the Caucus demanded
everything that behavioralism was not: an orientation
to the social problems and political crises of the time
and a discipline that would take collective stands on
controversial political issues (Bay 1968). The Vietnam
War, race, and poverty loomed especially large at the
outset, and environmental and feminist concerns were
soon added. Though not unanimously opposed to the
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scientific study of politics, Caucus members believed
that science should take a back seat to commitment
and relevance and that the explanation of political be-
havior was definitely not the proper center of gravity
of the discipline. Like its three predecessormovements,
the Caucus combined intellectual and political aims,
though its political aims were much more explicit than
those of behavioralism.
Much of the energy of the Caucus was devoted to
reform of the APSA itself. It ran candidates against
the official slate for both President and Council, and
although never successful in electing a president, did
get several members on the Council. (After the pas-
sage of several decades, erstwhile Caucusistas such as
TheodoreLowi and IraKatznelson could becomePres-
idents via the official slate.) Resistance from the now
mostly behavioralist APSA hierarchy could be fierce:
at the 1968 Annual Conference, panels proposed by
the caucus were frozen out. David Easton in 1969 was
more conciliatory, offering in his presidential address
a “New Revolution in Political Science” that would
essentially put behavioral techniques in general and
his systems model in particular in the service of social
problems. But the new set of dependent variables of-
fered by Easton did not assuage the Caucus or heal
the split (though it did help legitimate the develop-
ment of the subfield of public policy in the 1970s; see
Torgerson 1995, 229–30). The behavioralist hierarchy
was still firmly in place (even if its confidence was
shaken), resolutely opposed to politicization of the dis-
cipline. As Eulau (1972, 438) put it in his presidential
report, “we are not set up or organized for political
action, or the propagation of political points of view.”
Upon completing his term as editor of the Review in
1971, Austin Ranney recalls that in helping to appoint
his successor “I was very clear in mymind that it wasn’t
going to be any caucus type” (Ranney 1991, 230), and
it was not.
Rather than develop links with the social and po-
litical movements of the counter-culture, the Caucus
soon invested most of its energies in more professional
endeavors. As Lowi (1973, 43–44) lamented, it became
“the Caucus for a New Political Science Association.”
Its assault on the commanding heights of the APSA
having failed, the Caucus settled down to life as one
of the APSA’s ever-proliferating Organized Sections,
sponsoring its own (eventually quite small) set of pan-
els, and publishing a journal, New Political Science,
largely ignored by the rest of the discipline (it did
not appear in the ranking of 115 journals in political
science compiled by Garand and Giles [2003]). Many
of the younger members of the Perestroika e-mail list
in the early 2000s were apparently unaware of this last
attempted reformation of the discipline, and needed
reminding that once there was the Caucus, and indeed
that it lived still (Swidorski 2004).
The Caucus carried out a full frontal attack on be-
havioralism, but met substantial resistance. Applying
the test for a successful revolution with which I began,
the Caucus did not re-set the discipline’s agenda in a
way recognized by all practitioners. In particular, those
who rejected the Caucus program could simply and
safely ignore it.
PROLIFERATING RESEARCH PROGRAMS,
BUT NO FURTHER REVOLUTION
Much has changed in the discipline in the postbehav-
ioral era. During the 1980s, the state was brought back
in (Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985), suggest-
ing a cycle within the discipline (for an explanation
of such cycles in terms of changing political problems,
see Dryzek 1986). However, the state returned in a
form far different than that in which it left. Gone was
the comprehensivenormative statismof thediscipline’s
founding. Reacting against alleged societal reduction-
ism of the behavioral era, the new statists saw the state
as an independent variable in the sense that public
officials could have interests of their own that did not
simply reflect social forces. This was no revolution, just
a highlighting of particular kinds of actors and moti-
vations; behavioralists such as Truman happily recog-
nized public officials with interests determined by their
institutional home as participants in pluralist interac-
tion. As Almond (1988, 858) put it (referring to the
work of Eric Nordlinger, but the point is more gen-
erally applicable) “. . . there is no change in paradigm
here but rather a research program of considerable
promise intended to distinguish among polities accord-
ing to which state (governmental) personnel take the
initiative in the making of public policy. . . ” This new
statism could be ignored by non-practitioners of its
program, and the language of “the state” still does not
come easily to most American political scientists.
By the 1990s it was much harder for American polit-
ical scientists to avoid taking a view on rational choice
theory. This approach had been present for a long time,
beginning in earnest in the 1950s withwork byKenneth
Arrow, Duncan Black, Anthony Downs, and William
Riker. Its territory, and share of the Review’s pages,
subsequently expanded to the point where it appeared
to constitute thediscipline’smost popular researchpro-
gram. But rather than revolutionalizing political sci-
ence as a whole, rational choice stood alongside estab-
lished sorts of behavioral scholarship, the new statism,
cultural analysis, new institutionalism (of the nonra-
tional choice variety) and other research programs in
an increasingly diverse discipline. Some rational choice
practitioners presented their approach as an advance
onatheoretical behavioralism, ignoring the sorts of the-
ory that were present in behavioralism (such as Dahl’s
liberal democracy and Easton’s systems theory). And
even if they fell short in practice, behavioralists had
always proclaimed a belief in cumulative explanatory
theory.
CONCLUSION
Reorientations of the American discipline of political
science have been rare, with only two clear episodes in
a century and a half. This rarity has not been through
want of trying. The discipline has been very hard to
shift. If a movement takes direct aim at established
practices and understandings and meets with explicit
resistance, history suggests it does not succeed.
Because successful revolutions re-set the discipline’s
agenda, they define the terms of their opposition,which
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appears only after the movement has succeeded. (It is
in this sense that the Caucus was constituted by chil-
dren of the behavioral revolution.) But even successful
revolutions can find their agenda-setting ability fading
with time. So by 1950 the normative statism that domi-
nated the discipline in its early decades was exhausted.
Behavioralism’s legacy of methods, techniques, and re-
search topics persists to this day, perhaps most strongly
in the subfield of political psychology. But its capacity
to set the disciplinary agenda has faded since the 1970s
in the face of a proliferation of research programs, as
confirmed by the laments of prominent behavioralists
such as Eulau, Almond, and Easton about disciplinary
drift, fragmentation, and loss of purpose (Farr 1995,
220). Indeed, it has become harder even to speak of an
agenda for the discipline that could be re-set.
Perhaps with Thomas Kuhn (1962) in mind, many
scholars view disciplinary history in terms of eras set
apart by revolutions. However, pervasive evolution
maymatter just asmuch.Gradual change produced the
slow decline of the state from the 1900s to the 1940s
and the proliferation of approaches that characterized
the postbehavioral era.
The success of the early focus on the state owed less
to its normative commitments, always anomalous in the
American political system, than to its association with
professionalism and science. Behavioralism could reset
the discipline’s agenda because it entailed the selective
radicalization of existing commitments and practices.
Both were revolutions without enemies, and to date
that seems to be the only kind of revolution that can
succeed in reorienting American political science.
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